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This thesis discusses the issues faced by the Commander-
in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) staff in the
Subic/Cubi base closure process from the middle of calendar
year 1991 through the beginning of calendar year 1992, and
attempts to capture the strategic planning process used to
support the closure process. In this chapter, I provide an
overview of some of the forces and identify several key
players which had significant impact on the development of
CINCPACFLT' s withdrawal plan. In the second chapter, I
provide summaries of key interviews the researcher conducted
in gathering data to support analysis of the closure process.
In the third chapter, I provide a teaching note which
identifies a format which could be used by an instructor to
facilitate a management case constructed from analysis of the
base closure process. Lastly, in the final chapter, I will
provide a management case study which attempts to identify a
vision and extrapolate strategy used to develop supporting
management control systems to conduct the withdrawal and close
the bases.
Many external forces affected the CINCPACFLT staff's
decision making process from above, (e.g., Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) /United States Commander in Chief Pacific
(USCINCPAC) ) , and below (e.g., Commander United States Naval
Forces Philippines (COMUSNAVPHIL staff)), the chain of
command. A brief description of the relationships and
responsibilities among the individual staffs is provided
below.
The senior officer on site in the Philippines, Rear
Admiral (RADM) Mercer, wore three hats in administering U.S.
interests at Subic Bay and Cubi Point: Commander United
States Navy Forces Philippines, Commander United States
Facility Subic, and United States Commander in Chief
Representative Philippines. In the first two roles RADM
Mercer had reporting responsibilities to the Commander in
Chief United States Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) . Consequently,
the CINCPACFLT staff worked very closely with RADM Mercer's
staff in coordinating and working various Philippine and
Western Pacific issues.
Admiral Kelly as CINCPACFLT was responsible for developing
and implementing the withdrawal and closure plans for Subic
Bay and Cubi Point. Operationally, CINCPACFLT and his staff
had to satisfy USCINCPAC objectives to implement closure plans
within prescribed laws and treaties. Administratively,
CINCPACFLT reported to the CNO to ensure needs of the Navy
infrastructure were satisfied in this massive withdrawal
effort. The overall plan was briefed up the chain of command
to USCINCPAC and the Secretary of Defense, who approved the
plans for execution in February 1992.
II. FACTUAL DATABASE
A. RESEARCH INTERVIEW SUMMARIES
The majority of the interviews were conducted face to face
during the month of June 1992. Officers were selected for the
interview process because of their expertise with Philippine
issues and/or because of the nature of their involvement with
the Philippine Working Group (PWG) . Additional and follow-up
interviews were completed from July through December 1992.
The interview summaries which follow were condensed from
recorded tape and are written in first person form. Not all
of the interviews resulted in written interview summaries. A
number of the interviews provided background information for
the researcher and were not summarized. Most of the factual
text was written using the words of the interviewees. A
complete listing of persons interviewed is provided as
Appendix A. The sample questionnaire used to collect
interview information is included as Appendix B.
1. Interviews with CAPT E. Fessler, Negotiation
Representative to CINCPACREP PHIL, Jul 86 - Jun 90;
Presently Commanding Officer Naval Investigative
Service Area Command Pacific
In the late 1980 's the United States government tried
very aggressively to re-negotiate the United States - Republic
of the Philippines Military Bases Agreement of 1947 (MBA)
.
However, the outcome of a successful treaty negotiation was in
doubt as evidenced by the extensive negative press the
negotiations and base issues received in the local media from
19 86 onward. In March 19 89, DOD began seriously considering
the distinct possibility of a full or partial closure of
United States facilities in the Philippines.
By Joint Chiefs of staff (JCS) direction, a secret
level joint committee was formed by USCINCPACREP Philippines
to develop a closure plan for the possible closure of the
United States facilities at Clark Air Base, the Naval complex
at Subic Bay and Cubi Point, the government housing facilities
at San Miguel and the communications station at Santa Rita.
This plan became known as the Facilities Closure Plan (FCP)
and served as the principal basis for withdrawal plans which
were actually implemented.
There was a one year time -phased period for completion
of the closure process built in as a basic assumption in the
plan to satisfy a worst case scenario should the Philippine
government demand complete withdrawal. Of primary concern in
FCP planning was the deteriorating security environment in the
Philippines which was no longer considered supportive of U.S.
interests and forces. There were pressures from political
terrorist activities as well as intrusions to facility
security by individuals in search of illegal economic gain.
Previous experience in the turnover of U.S. facilities to the
Government of the Philippines (i.e., Clark Air Force Base
following the Mount Pinatubo eruption and Sangley Point in
Manila Harbor (circa 1968-69)) demonstrated the need to
maintain strong incentives to ensure adequate security
policies and procedures be kept in place during the turnover
process. Logistics planning was another area studied in great
depth within the formulation stages of the FCP. Considerable
effort was expended to determine if there were assets
available to support removal of U.S. property, as defined in
the 1988 amendment to the MBA, out of the Philippines. A
basic assumption was made that most "removable" property would
be moved. There was effort expended to make detailed lists of
both removable and non- removable property to get a handle on
the magnitude of future effort which might be required.
The planning effort was complicated by the political
sensitivity and classification of the process, but
nevertheless went forward aggressively. Navy planners engaged
in the FCP process strongly suspected their efforts would
eventually result in some lesser degree of U.S. presence in
the Philippines.
2. Interviews with MAJ Craig Huddles ton, Plans and Policy
Assistant for Marine Corp Matters/Southeast Asia Plans
Officer/Lead Member of the Philippine Working Group
During the Planning Phase
My primary responsibilities were to develop the
current version of the Philippine withdrawal plan now being
implemented using baseline documents, such as the Facilities
Closure Plan (FCP) , and other CINCPACFLT staff inputs from
many different action officer codes. Development of the
withdrawal plan was predicated upon actions by the Philippine
government in determining whether the Basing Agreement would
be ratified by the Philippine Senate. Upon rejection of the
renegotiated Basing Agreement by the GOP, we began looking in
great detail at the various withdrawal options in removing our
forces. The Philippine government did not initially mandate
the withdrawal be accomplished in one year. We looked at
various options for developing the timeline from six months
out to three years. President Aquino basically made the
decision for us on 27 December 1991 by canceling the military
bases agreement after the Philippine Senate rejected the
negotiated proposal before it for ratification. The rejection
by the Senate automatically implemented a one year time limit
for drawdown and withdrawal
.
A key issue for us was that the preliminary planning
was accomplished under an umbrella of secrecy so as not to
influence the Philippine Government during the basing- rights
negotiations. This umbrella of secrecy was detrimental to the
planning process and created much confusion during early-
formulation of the current plan. Many areas of expertise
captured at the subordinate (implementation) level could not
be brought to bear on the planning process for fear of giving
away perceived vital information in the government
negotiations.
Another issue was trying to determine what type of
withdrawal was to be conducted (partial or full) . If a full
withdrawal was required much of the property at Subic/Cubi was
infrastructure and would be difficult to move. Many of the
people, and positions they filled, were evaluated non-
essential if the U.S. military left the Philippines.
Necessary or vital positions could be moved to other U.S.
interests in the Western Pacific. During the planning phase
in the summer of 1991 we discovered we could do away with 4100
personnel billets with little impact on readiness. These
billet reductions fit nicely into the Pacific Fleet's
downsizing program for reducing the overall force structure in
the Pacific. Hence, the withdrawal, as it became known, was
actually a partial withdrawal in that U.S. interests such as
people, ammunition, and some equipment would be removed, but
certain infrastructures were to be left behind and closed
(such as the naval magazine and the ship repair facility)
.
The staffing of the withdrawal and closure issues were
generally accomplished through the Philippine Working Group
(PWG) established internally within the Commander-in-Chief
U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) staff. There were other
members of the staff who did impact the process but were not
members of the PWG. The PWG had been established prior to the
Mount Pinatubo evacuations when it became evident that
continued presence of U.S. forces might not be feasible under
current international agreements. The PWG was a management
mechanism utilized by senior staff officers to work Philippine
issues in early 1991.
As mentioned earlier, December 1991 marked the
Government of the Philippines (GOP) cancellation of the treaty
for basing U.S. forces on Philippine soil. CINCPACFLT
immediately requested Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) /United
States Commander-in-Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC) approval to
implement the closure and withdrawal plan as currently planned
for the Naval Base at Subic Bay. The initial approved date to
complete the process was 16 December 1992, however, the latest
revised estimates approved are for closure completion by 24
November 1992. January 1992 marked the shift from the
planning phase to the execution phase of the withdrawal plan.
The shift to the execution phase saw the administration and
management of the plan provisions shift to RADM Holian, Deputy
Chief of Staff for Resources and Logistics for CINCPACFLT.
CDR D. Matthews (comptroller representative) assumed PWG chair
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responsibilities for RADM Holian's organization. RADM Holian
could have chosen any number of capable persons within the
staff to assume PWG chair responsibilities. Speculation as to
why a comptroller representative was chosen centers on the
perceived need for a capable respected officer, who could
cover all the bases for drawdown execution, and present a
competent case for a near certain GAO audit which is projected
to follow upon completion of the withdrawal process.
3. Interviews with CDR Danny Matthews, Operational
Systems Development Branch for the Pacific Fleet
Comptroller/Lead Member of the Philippine Working
Group During Evolution Execution
My involvement in the Philippine withdrawal process
was to act as the coordinator for the Philippine Working Group
(PWG) during the implementation phase of the withdrawal and
closure process. As such, I coordinated information flows and
was considered the resident expert. Additionally, I was
responsible to the chain of command to ensure the staff and
the PWG carried out directions from higher authority in the
formulation and execution of the Philippine withdrawal and
facility closure plans. I got the job because I was a
competent available body (my billet was excess to the fleet
comptroller) and could chair the PWG for the withdrawal
evolution through to its completion.
The management strategy to conduct this evolution was
developed through a manpower intensive planning and
coordination process between PWG members and members of RADM
Mercer's staff in the Philippines. The strategy culminated in
the development of a comprehensive plan for the withdrawal
that included mechanisms for removing U.S. personnel,
disestablishing or moving individual commands, moving U.S.
property (including ammunition) out of the Philippines,
reducing the number of foreign national employees through a
reduction in force program (RIF) , disposing of excess property
through appropriate channels, and turning over selected
equipment to the Philippine government as provided for through
international agreement and U.S. law.
A contingency withdrawal plan had been developed in
the late 1980' s and was completed in 1990. This plan was
known as the Facilities Closure Plan (FCP) and provided the
PWG a good foundation from which to start development of the
current withdrawal plan. Missing links in the FCP included
timeliness and specifics about how personnel and command
issues would be handled. The primary effort in developing the
FCP was documenting what equipment was in the Philippines, and
what would be reasonable cost estimates to remove the
equipment. As it turned out, the FCP significantly overstated
the withdrawal costs probably because other mechanisms for
disposing of equipment which are being used were not initially
considered. Much of the documented equipment will be sold in
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the Philippines through DRMO Subic Bay or turned over to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines under section 519 of the
Foreign Assistance Act. The FCP was a good place to start in
planning for the implementation of base withdrawal and
closure.
Once the withdrawal and closure plan had been approved
for execution, I (as PWG coordinator) became the timeline
manager by continuously reviewing current and future issues to
determine if we were meeting our goals. The situation
reporting system (SITREPS) via the Navy message system was
used to track events and extraordinary items and issues. The
SITREPS flowed up the chain of command from COMUSNAVPHIL staff
to CINCPACFLT. CINCPACFLT made official status reports to
higher authority reflecting relevant statistics and plan
status. SITREPS received from COMUSNAVPHIL were addressed or
routed to appropriate commands and/or staff codes for action
and information.
The PWG was one of several management mechanisms which
was relied on from time to time to make short fused command
recommendations and decisions. When an emergent issue
required attention, a PWG issues meeting was called where
cognizant staff members would be available at one place at one
time to hear the issues, work the problems, make
recommendations and/or decisions. However, after the
withdrawal process procedures were implemented and sustained,
most new or evolving issues were generally handled in a
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routine staff environment where the Assistant Chiefs of Staff
(ACOS's) worked individual issues by distilling them to the
appropriate action officer experts for staffing. A Philippine
Withdrawal Coordination Group (PWCG) made up of seven members
from the PWG and chaired by me, acted as the steering group
for channeling various issues to the appropriate staff
management mechanisms for action. This group was also used to
provide flag officer decision support when immediate issues
and questions required nearly immediate responses.
Approximately every two weeks an update brief was
given by PWG members to ADM Kelly (CINCPACFLT) , DCOS's, ACOS's
and interested parties on the staff to bring everybody up to
speed on the big picture on drawdown proceedings . The brief
proved to be a valuable feedback mechanism from which top
management could provide direct feedback on upper management
perceptions to individuals or group representatives in
attendance.
There were occasional disconnects between the staffs
(FLEET versus NAVPHIL) , mainly because the people closest to
the issues were in the Philippines and they tried to
accomplish movements of people and equipment more quickly than
the plan allowed. This created coordination problems, but
ways were found to address these problems, mainly by providing
NAVPHIL any and all support needed in their execution of the
withdrawal plan.
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A coordinated lessons learned package is being
developed and stored for future reference. Overall, I'm very
pleased with the progress of the withdrawal and look forward
to a favorable completion of the process ahead of the
initially approved schedule. There is concerted effort to
ensure the U.S. military leaves the Philippines under a
favorable light. The region is still strategically important
to our interests in the Pacific.
4. Interview with: LTCOL J. Hudack, Fleet Logistics
Program/FMF Liaison; CDR T. Luzinski, Security
Assistance/FMS Plans
This office became heavily involved in planning for
the withdrawal process in November of 1991. Negotiations for
continued U.S. presence were ongoing. However, the status of
treaty approval was uncertain as the process was being
subjected to continual changing political winds.
Once the decision to withdraw was made we turned our
efforts to carrying out the plans within various constraints.
Our biggest issue was the one year time period constraint to
implement the withdrawal and complete the facility shutdown.
An area of concern was how to close or move 90 plus commands,
many of which were stovepipes (outside CINCPACFLT claimancy)
within the constraints of time, money, personnel (including
dependents), volume of cargo and bi-polar country politics.
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The initial plan to implement drawdown and closure was
known as the Facilities Closure Plan (FCP) , which had been
developed some five years earlier. The FCP attempted to
attach useful estimates to data points within the known
constraints, but in reality no one really knew the magnitude
or the scope of what was necessary to get us out of the
Philippines in one year.
As it turned out, the estimates in the FCP for the
volume of cargo that needed to be moved had been greatly over-
estimated for several reasons: 1) The FCP assumed that most
of the property at the facilities would require removal which
turned out not to be the case. Much of the property was to be
left behind and turned over to the Philippine government or
sold on the open market. 2) No cost estimates had been done
to determine whether or not it was economically feasible to
remove and ship the material. A deeper analysis indicated
much of the material's salvage value was less then the costs
which would be incurred to move and ship the material back to
the United States.
The FCP estimates were useful, but there was an
immediate need to develop a current Transportation Requirement
Plan. A World Wide Military Command and Control system was
deployed to Subic in December 1991 to help with this planning
effort
.
The material to be left behind was to be disposed of
in one of two ways. First, the government of the Philippines
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(GOP) was presented "The First Right to Acquire" to purchase
the material outright. If GOP declined to purchase, the
material was to be turned over to the Defense Reutilization
and Marketing Office (DRMO) for disposal on the local economy.
The second method to dispose of the material was discarded by
CINCPACFLT staffers early in the planning process because of
time constraints. However, the "519" Program, as it's
affectionately known, eventually became one of the prime
disposal vehicles during the withdrawal process.
Section 519 of the Foreign Assistance Act permits the
transfer of excess non- lethal defense articles to friendly
foreign governments to help modernize their defense
capabilities. In April 1991, the State Department, citing our
longstanding relationship with the Philippines as a Mutual
Defense Treaty ally, instructed the American Embassy in Manila
to be as forthcoming as possible with respect to transfer of
such articles to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
under section 519. In late April, the American embassy
delivered a diplomatic notice advising the GOP it had the
right to obtain outright title to excess equipment valued at
approximately 34 Million dollars for 4.1 Million dollars or to
permit the AFP to acquire the material for use under section
519. In July, after the Defense Security Assistance Agency
completed required notification to congress of the intention
to transfer this equipment, the AFP began screening and
selecting equipment for its use under section 519. Material
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which was not selected by the AFP was then offered for sale to
the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
5. Interview with CDR P. J. Battin, International Law
Attorney
This office is primarily concerned with ensuring that
CINCPACFLT as the primary agent for the U.S. government,
complies with the statutory and fiscal authority granted
during the withdrawal and closure process at Subic Bay and
Cubi Point. The basis for this authority extends from public
law. Examples include Article 519 of the Foreign Assistance
Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
Foremost in our efforts was what to do with all the
government property at Naval Station Subic and Naval Air
Station Cubi Point. More specifically was how to conduct a
"hot" turnover of Cubi Point, a minimum IFR capable airfield,
to the Philippine Government. Midway through the closure
process, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
United States government decided that the turnover of a
minimum IFR capable airfield at Cubi Point was a suitable
course of action because of perceived benefits to both
parties. The primary question to be answered was how to
legally turn over all the associated assets. Several
alternatives were considered: (1) Foreign Military Sales




FMS became the avenue by which we structured the
mechanisms for the turnover of Cubi Point. The AFP was to
have a viable presence at Cubi Point after the pullout by U.S.
forces and hence would firmly anchor the legal basis for the
turnover of the facilities at Cubi Point.
Another issue that has a legal basis and required an
innovative solution is what to do about the U.S. personnel who
may be on legal hold come November 24, 1992. There were as
many as 40 personnel who were accused of some crime under the
Philippine criminal code and have been placed on legal hold in
the Philippines during the withdrawal process. The U.S.
government has a responsibility to the GOP under terms of the
Military Bases Agreement (MBA) to make these personnel
available for court proceedings. Following the closure of
Subic, those service members remaining on international legal
hold will be temporarily transferred to COMNAVFORJAPAN
.
Should a court hearing be called on an international legal
case, that person, accompanied by a U.S. Navy Judge Advocate
General, and represented in the Republic of the Philippines
(RP) by a Filipino attorney, will return to the court for the
proceeding. Following the expiration of the basing agreement
on 31 December 1992, the appropriate representative within the
RP Department of Justice will be notified by our State
Department that service members will no longer be returned.
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6. Interview with CDR Clay Ching, Head Facilities
Planning and Real Estate Department; CDR Ed Eng,
Deputy Head Public Works Support Department, Special
Assistant For Ecology
The major issues for our offices dealt with the
planning and moving of functions and personnel at Subic/Cubi
Point that were not being moved back to CONUS and were not
being disestablished. We looked to see if other Western
Pacific locations could handle these additional functions and
personnel. In some cases new facilities were required to
support these movements to Guam and Singapore. Examples of
commands/functions which were moved include air squadron VRC-
50 and logistics support ships to Guam, and logistics support
staff to Singapore.
We also looked at the environmental hazards at the
existing facilities at Subic/Cubi Point. The policy
determination was made, in accordance with existing treaties,
to remove any existing hazardous material, but not to engage
in any massive cleanups of existing contamination of
facilities the U.S. was vacating. A conscious effort is being
made to document the environmental status of the facilities to
address any future issues once the drawdown and closure is
complete. Overall, most of us feel our environmental record
in the Philippines is very good as compared to the host
country record.
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We found the PWG was an excellent mechanism by which
to share information and to point the herd, so to speak, in
addressing the complex issues associated with drawdown,
withdrawal and closure. Many times we were able to get early
looks and ideas on how to address facility planning issues
from the information being shared at PWG meetings. Early in
planning process we found the security classification of the
negotiations and contingent withdrawal planning to be a major
stumbling block in trying to accomplish efficient facilities
planning. Much of the information we needed was located at
other commands and we were not privy to the classified initial
planning effort.
The large number of the commands involved and
multitude of claimancies contributed to a slow, sometimes
disjointed, planning and execution process. CINCPACFLT filled
in very well in making coordinated decisions. Where
coordination was not always feasible an "unless otherwise
directed" approach was used to make and implement decisions
which contributed to a more manageable coordinated evolution.
7. Interview with LT Steve Manning, Fleet Law
Enforcement/Physical Security
This office is heavily involved in the security
planning for the five phase drawdown of the United States
facility at Subic Bay in the Republic of the Philippines.
Additionally, this office is responsible to ensure the
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Commander, United States Facility at Subic carries out the
approved security plan for withdrawal and closure by
conducting on site security assessment visits. The persons
responsible for the conduct of actual site security include
Navy, Marine Corps, and Philippine National security
personnel. U.S. forces are also charged with oversight
responsibility for security arrangements to the Navy housing
facility at San Miguel. This responsibility provided a unique
challenge in that the facilities at San Miguel are not
contiguous to the Subic facilities, although many of the Navy
personnel housed at San Miguel were assigned to duties at
Subic Bay. This security requirement (both for the San Miguel
facility and for the personnel transiting between San Miguel
and Subic Bay) continued until sometime after the Mount
Pinatubo eruption, at which time all U.S. personnel were moved
onto Subic and the San Miguel facilities were turned over to
the Philippine government.
Once the decision to withdraw was made, a three phase
security plan was developed to ensure security continuity
during the withdrawal process. This plan was a coordinated
plan between many different agencies responsible for security
at Subic and was given to the Commanding Officer (CO.) of the
Marine Barracks to administer. The three phase plan evolved
into a five phase plan by adding greater detail to the initial
phases of the overall plan.
20
To a large degree, the centralization of security
command and control to the CO. of the Marine Barracks and the
phased security plans contributed to a very stable evolution
in maintaining area security. The primary threats to Subic
security are the economic intruder and from groups that are
against American presence in the Philippines. These threats
have resulted in the establishment of a multi- layered security
net which includes gate guards, perimeter patrols and counter
insurgency forces, all capable of defending the facility
should it be attacked.
The majority of the security forces will remain intact
throughout the withdrawal process . The only security
organization that was formally disbanded was the 500 -man
Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) that augmented the full-time
U.S. facility security forces. The ASF manpower is provided
by tenant commands. Many of these commands have started to
lose people to the drawdown and can no longer afford to
support the ASF. The first big cut in the size of the
security forces will occur when the Naval Station and housing
areas are turned over to the GOP, greatly reducing the land
area requiring U.S. security protection. U.S. security forces
will remain at Naval Air Station Cubi Point (This will mark
the end of Phase III of the security withdrawal plan)
.
Many of the Navy and Marine security forces will not
begin leaving until Phase IV. Many dependents will leave
before their sponsors. Who leaves is a function of tenant
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command desires and when each command intends to close up
shop. Everyone in Subic has been assigned the label
"essential" or "non-essential," with the non-essential
personnel being the first to go. The overall goal is to have
all U.S. personnel out by 24 November 1992. Law enforcement
and Marine Corp security personnel are scheduled to be the
last U.S. personnel to leave the facilities in the
Philippines
.
The security portion of this withdrawal plan has gone
very smoothly. The only criticism I can offer is that the
initial information flow was not as smooth as it should have
been. Given the complexity of the task at hand, more effort
should have been made to make the periodic Situation Reports
actually reflect the status of events. Several times major
security issues were discovered back- channel (unofficially),
with no mention whatsoever in official channels of any
problems at hand. The breakdown in needed information flow
makes the coordination aspects of the withdrawal that much
more difficult.
8. Interview with Mr. B. Posnecker, Western Pacific
Activities Officer
The major issues for my organization in the withdrawal
process were a function of the process stages. Early on, most
of the effort went into planning for withdrawal from the Ship
Repair Facility (SRF) Subic under three possible scenarios, to
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include: a full, partial, and leave everything behind option.
Consideration was also given to which Ship Maintenance
Facilities in the Western Pacific were to be strengthened to
fill the void left by the closure of Subic. The multitude of
options, plus the classification of the entire process
(political sensitivity of on-going negotiations) , really
contributed to a complicated and often frustrating effort.
As events progressed, and the determination was made
to conduct a full withdrawal during a one year time horizon,
the major issue became the disposal of the minor property and
industrial Plant Equipment (IPE) that was considered to be
excess. Options considered were to turnover the equipment via
procedures at DRMO (unbolting and removing for salvage) or to
turnover the IPE in place. The complexity of the logistics
for moving the IPE and political issues (519 program) drove
the decision to leave the excess IPE not screened to AFP/GOP
in place for turnover to DRMO.
Our major personnel issue was when to put the
Philippine Nationals, who were working for the industrial
activity, into the Reduction in Force program (RIF) . There
were political sensitivities surrounding this aspect because
many of these people had been working for the U.S. government
for a number of years and it was unclear as to what type of
benefits were going to be conveyed to these people. The final




Other issues which were important, but of lesser
significance were: (1) when to stop ship repair work
(including emergent work) to divert that manpower to the
closure of the facilities and to begin the RIF plan; and (2)
when to remove major assets such as barges and floating
drydocks for minimum impact to the operating repair facility-
yet meet the requirements for time phasing in the withdrawal
plan. All of these evolutions, planned to be implemented and
completed within the one year time constraints, are in
progress and on schedule.
Lessons learned which could have helped smooth the
process include: 1) Declassify plan provisions earlier to help
in the coordination process (hard to do when politics are
involved). 2) Make policy decisions earlier (mechanism for
disposal of some equipment has yet to be decided, mainly
because of politics) . 3) Anticipate the unexpected.
Environmental concerns in transferring the AFDM-8 (debris and
organisms in floating drydock ballast tanks) to Pearl Harbor
were unexpected, and for a short period of time this office
dedicated a large amount of effort to satisfy these concerns.
4) Put headquarters staff liaison on site to help with the
coordination process while allowing the facility managers to
concentrate on the tasks at hand. Overall, considering the
magnitude of the process, the entire evolution has gone well
and has been a valuable learning experience. Many of the
lessons learned should be beneficial should other U.S.
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facilities at foreign locations be closed due to changing
force structure.
9. Interview with CDR Marvin Dodge, Military Sealift
Command Liaison Officer to Pacific Fleet; Commanding
Officer Military Sealift Command TAGOS Unit Pacific
Military Sealift Command (MSC) was losing a major
overseas operating facility because of the Philippine
withdrawal and the closure of the facilities at Subic Bay.
MSC's major role in this issue was devising a strategy to move
MSC assets to other locations to ensure a satisfactory level
of service was sustained to operating forces in the Western
Pacific (WESTPAC)
.
Moving the MSC ships was a relatively painless process
because most of these ships operated with professional mariner
crews and were at sea or in friendly WESTPAC ports during much
of their operating lives. The only time these ships came to
Subic was for logistical purposes for maintenance and
supplies. Many of the support functions associated with MSC
ship assets are the responsibilities of other organizations;
they were not MSC's responsibility for withdrawal, except for
the desire that a like capability be established elsewhere in
WESTPAC for MSC use. Many of these organizations are being
transferred to facilities at Guam/Yokosuka or are being
established in Singapore.
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MSC did play a large role in moving people and
equipment out of the Philippines. Initially, there was
concern there might be a shortage of MSC assets to accomplish
the withdrawal. However, where there were shortages, MSC was
able to contract "out of house" for services to accomplish
drawdown operations.
A relatively significant issue for MSC was the
shipment of outbound hazardous waste. MSC's position was that
if the subject waste was properly documented (i.e., was
properly packaged, and had an approved ultimate destination)
,
MSC would ship the material
.
The Philippine withdrawal provided an excellent
opportunity for MSC to take a hard look at the organization
with the overall goal of making MSC more cost efficient in the
era of declining budgets. Wherever possible, MSC has
consolidated operations with only minimal impact on customers.
MSC is continuing to look at remaining operations for
viability with any new capabilities being cost validated
before implementation. This internal look would have come
eventually, but the Philippine withdrawal has just helped
speed things up.
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10. Interview with CAPT Don Edgerton, Commander Defense
Logistics Agency Pacific and Defense Reutilization and
Marketing Region Pacific (DRMO)
This office dealt with the issues surrounding the
disposal of excess personal property. We attempted to
identify what property we were taking with us, what property
we were leaving behind, and how we would dispose of the
property left behind. All real property would revert to the
GOP as per previous agreement on 24 November 1992.
Early inventories of some equipment had been conducted
in the mid- 1980 's under planning conducted internal to the
Facilities Closure Plan. The Naval Hospital and Ship Repair
Facility had good inventories, but other organizations at
Subic Bay needed a crash program to document and do data entry
on equipment not yet properly identified. All equipment not
slated for removal on these inventories automatically went on
the excess property list. Naval Supply Depot (NSD) had a
special problem in generating excess property lists. NSD was
required to query Western Pacific depot managers to fill any
of their respective inventory shortages, and also query local
supply managers to fill inventory needs before excess property
lists could be generated. As per previous agreement, the
excess property lists were presented to the GOP for "First
Right of Refusal" to purchase the items on the lists. When
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GOP declined to purchase these items they were turned into
DRMO for disposal
.
The property turned into DRMO was disposed of in one
of four ways: 1) Any DOD activity which wanted the items
could obtain them through established salvage procedures. 2)
Disposal could be through provisions of article 519 of the
Foreign Assistance Act (non- lethal aid to modernize the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP)). 3) The property was
disposed of through direct grant to various charitable
organizations both inside and outside the Philippines. 4)
Anything left was put up for sale and auctioned off to the
highest bidder.
The one thing which could have helped DRMO in dealing
with the volume of material to be handled during the
withdrawal would have been to have more accurate equipment
lists early in the planning phase. This one act could have
positively impacted the overall withdrawal process. We are
still making up equipment lists at some activities. One of
the reasons given for not working on these lists sooner had to
do with the secrecy surrounding the base closure negotiations.
Little effort was paid to comprehensive inventories because it
was felt at the time that these activities would tip the U.S.
hand in dealing with the GOP.
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11. Interview with Mr. Jim Shaw, Chief of Planning and
Operations for the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
,
Pacific
From DLA's perspective, putting together the FCP was
difficult because the individual services tended to act on
their own behalf in the development of the joint Facilities
Closure Plan. This narrow focus made the FCP less robust than
it could have been, which may be partially to blame for the
disaster experienced by the Air Force during the emergency
evacuation and subsequent closure of Clark Air Base following
the Mount Pinatubo eruption. To my knowledge no withdrawal
contingency plan was put into effect at Clark. When U.S.
forces returned to the base and observed the destruction and
looting, it was determined by the national powers to turn the
base over to the GOP with no attempt by the U.S. to salvage
anything with the exception of personal effects.
Another element lacking in the FCP was the absence of
the application of established logistics procedures such as
Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) .
These procedures provide detailed guidance and contingency
procedures on how to handle logistics issues during a base
withdrawal . Why these procedures were not incorporated into
the FCP is unknown since DLA made the players aware of their
existence.
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One thing the Navy has done which is helping this
effort has been their willingness to get onboard with the
proper documentation for all of the affected equipment. Not
only is the paper trail well documented, but the historical
records are well organized, and should be of very high quality
so that future inquiries will be able to track any of the
equipment from cradle to grave. This feature will be
important when records are looked at by the Government
Accounting Office, or if Congressional testimony is required
to explain any of the equipment disposal decisions and
subsequent action taken.
12. Interviews with CDR Mary Dimel, Pay/Personnel
Administration, Support Program Manager; YNCM Gary
Eisenbraun, Military/Pers/Civilian Advisor; DKCS
Ricardo Francisco, Military Pay Advisor
Our job was to help coordinate the personnel transfer
process all DOD personnel at Subic Bay and Cubi Point
facilities, which included all facets of personnel
administrative processing, pay and dependent issues.
Timing of the orders and subsequent movements of
affected people and their households were significant
milestones to ensure a smooth drawdown. Many of the tenant
commands were reluctant to let their people go because of
drawdown workloads. As the drawdown progressed, much of the
anticipated workload was accomplished in the early phases of
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the withdrawal. Consequently, commands began to attempt to
move people earlier than planned. Additional support and
planning was necessary to arrange increased Air Mobility
Command (AMC) flights, process order modifications, and ensure
fiscal year 1992 Permanent Change of Station funding was
available to support the moves.
On January 1, 1992 duty in the Philippines became
unaccompanied for newly arriving members and for members
serving in the Philippines that did not already have
dependents with them. Any dependents acquired after 1 Jan
1992 could not receive command sponsorship and hence would not
be eligible for current government support or funded travel to
their next duty station. This policy was enacted for planning
purposes in trying to establish boundaries for determining the
number of personnel moves necessary to complete the withdrawal
process and stay within regulations.
Effective communication would be a cornerstone in
successfully completing the withdrawal within the parameters
of previous treaties and USCINCPAC/CNO guidance. Use of
selected address information groups (AIG'S) for message
traffic, Detailer team visits, and comprehensive policy
messages were some of the communication mechanisms used to
help coordinate the personnel issues during the withdrawal.
We tried hard to make sure each individual's needs were met.
Policy changes from higher authority were not always clear
cut. Near constant communications were required with in-
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country staff and other government representatives to resolve
unique situations of individual service members.
The military retirees who choose to remain behind when
the drawdown is complete will face a much different situation
then they do now. All the social service support will be
closed as well as administrative support to handle pay matters
such as monthly annuity checks. Retired members are being
urged to go on direct deposit so that they may receive their
pay. However, there are no banks currently in the Philippines
which accept direct deposit transfers from U.S. banks.
Members are being advised to have their checks sent to a U.S.
bank from which they can write checks for cash at banks in the
Philippines. No matter how it's cut, the retirees remaining
behind are facing a much different environment with no U.S.
support structure.
13. Interview with CDR Forrest Kirk, Services and Base
Development Officer, Lessons Learned Coordinator
This office deals with assembling the lessons learned
from the Philippine withdrawal and closure of the associated
bases. Two sets of lesson learned files will be kept: one for
historical purposes at the DOD level, and one for the locally
controlled base closures file. Both sets will be available to
support further base closures in the continuing DOD drawdown.
Domestic base closures are similar to the structure of
the Philippine withdrawal only in that both are base closures.
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Subic/Cubi Point are being closed in one year, while domestic
bases usually require a five to seven year phased withdrawal
and closure period. The primary reasons for the longer
drawdown periods for domestics stem from increased analysis
requirements, such as economic assessments and environmental
impacts, as well as other political considerations. The
lessons learned from the Philippine withdrawal will be most
useful if we ever need to plan for closing other overseas
bases
.
14. Interview with MS. Maureen Kleintop, Fleet
Management/Civilian Personnel Director
This office was responsible for coordinating the
removal of about 13,000 civilian personnel from the facilities
at Cubi/Subic Point during the withdrawal process. The
overall goals are to transfer about 800 DOD civilian
personnel, and to return about 12,000 Philippine Nationals to
the local economy through a Reduction in Force (RIF) program.
Early in the planning process, security of the
withdrawal plans precluded discussions with in- country
representatives. With the absence of these discussions the
PWG was forced to do preplanning (i.e., "What are the things
you have to think about to disestablish and withdraw?").
Once withdrawal was announced in December 1991, RIF
planning went into high gear. All area Commanding Officers
were asked for downsizing plans for their activities. Effort
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at the headquarters level was oriented toward briefing
preparation so that the CINC could brief the SECNAV and CNO.
Constant coordination was maintained with other claimants
because a number of the stovepipe organizations had
significant numbers of personnel affected by this evolution.
There were many data points for the development of the
RIF plan. These included severance pay, mid-year bonuses,
end-year bonuses, and the annual October pay raise.
Additionally, security played a role in the development of the
RIF plan. Because of the fear of retribution from some of
those affected by the RIF program, all of the U.S. citizens
living off base were required to move on base before major
RIF's could begin. This was a tremendous burden to all
concerned because the Subic facilities were limited in the
ability to care for additional people. Many of the U.S.
citizens living on the economy were homesteaders and had to
uproot their lives to fulfill this security requirement.
Despite all the difficulties, the plan was well prepared and
is being executed. We have experienced up to 500 RIF's a week
since the plan was implemented.
DOD civilians have several options once they leave the
Philippines. Many are retiring, while others are executing
return rights granted by agreement prior to stationing in the
Philippines. Others are going on to different occupations
outside the federal government, while a few are executing
agreements to stay overseas at other U.S. facilities. Many of
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the affected people are finding that their jobs are winding
down more quickly than envisioned and they are leaving the
Philippines earlier than planned. All-in-all, when you look
at the scope of what we have accomplished in such a short
period of time, things are going pretty well.
15. Interview with CAPT Gary Ikuma, Fleet Aviation
Material Readiness Officer
This office dealt with the issues in withdrawing and
turnover of Cubi Point Airfield to the GOP. This included the
removal of non- excess equipment for use at other United States
facilities.
During the withdrawal planning process, the Philippine
government became interested in receiving Cubi Point as an
operational airfield. This evolved into a "hot turnover" of
an Instrument Flight Rule (IFR) airfield at Cubi Point. The
"hot turnover" concept initially contradicted the equipment
withdrawal guidelines and strategies. The GOP wanted a gratis
turnover of much equipment that was non -excess. The U.S.
government (embassy/State Department) felt that a "hot
turnover" of the airfield, facilities and supporting
equipment, would enhance the utility of the field through
economic/military purposes, and serve to establish goodwill in
the new relationships emerging between the two governments.
We prepared a plan for presentation to the GOP which
identified costs and equipment deemed necessary to support an
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IFR airfield. This included non- excess equipment and excess
equipment which would be provided under section 519 of the
Foreign Assistance Act. Initially, every piece of equipment
identified in the plan was asked for by GOP including an old,
difficult - to-maintain, ground control approach radar. We
understood that the GOP would want to utilize Cubi Point for
civilian purposes.
The initial turnover plan had three milestones to
effect the turnover process: 1) Identify all the equipment
and conduct a documented turnover. 2) Provide a training
program to operate the equipment, some of which is totally
unique to the U.S. military. 3) Provide parts support and
manuals to support operations through some undetermined period
of time. As stated earlier, a good deal of the equipment in
question was not in excess to the U.S. Government, yet was
necessary to accomplish the "hot turnover" process. The final
planned course of action was the establishment of a Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) case to enable the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) to purchase non- excess equipment using FMS
financial credits. Because of the scarcity of these funds,
the AFP decided to purchase only a TACAN and a non-directional
receiver for navigational aids (no radars) , in addition to
support equipment. They also purchased a logistics support
package for this equipment. The value of the FMS case is 2.37
million dollars for the equipment and 2.26 million dollars for
training, support, and spare parts. Additional equipment
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obtained through Section 519 (excess equipment) completes the
turnover package. The airfield will be a non- radar
environment, (minimally) IFR- capable field. Although the
equipment purchased under FMS will not be compensated for with
additional funds for the Navy, the overall dollar value is
relatively small and will have little if any impact on the
U.S. Navy operations.
Early involvement by GOP, in clarifying their
desires, would have been extremely useful in developing the
"hot turnover" plan. Many elements of the plan were
constructed without any GOP "subject matter experts" (i.e.,
decision makers on-site), until development of the FMS case.
Many elements of the initial plan were constructed by making
assumptions on GOP intentions and requirements. A decision on
who the accepting agency for the Philippines would be to
receive the airfield was not made until very late in the
turnover process. Because of the ambiguous situation, many
amendments and changes occurred and, consequently, the process
was not smooth until the development of the FMS case.
Although there are many lessons to be learned from this
withdrawal and turnover, one may question how often the United
States government turns over operational airfields to foreign
governments. What we learned may never be used again.
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16. Interview with CDR John Quinn, Fleet Environmental
Officer
Much of the withdrawal planning was ongoing when this
office was formed in January 1992. Up to this point, this
office has been primarily responsible for ensuring the U.S.
Government has met the fairly minimal environmental
requirements that currently exist overseas. U.S.
environmental laws do not apply overseas because of
international comity. This basically means that we comply
with the host country's environmental laws. We have made sure
that environmental protection at our overseas bases is
sufficient to protect human health. There have been examples
of actions, although not illegal, that were not in accordance
with U.S. standards.
The issue of environmental protection during the
withdrawal is not so much present day pollution, but to what
extent we will clean up the facilities before we leave them.
The superfund laws of the 1980' s had provisions which allowed
the United States Government to allocate monies for the
cleanup of old contamination sites. The United States
military has many of these old contamination sites. DOD has
developed an Installation Restoration (IR) program which can
be used as the vehicle to facilitate cleanup of old
contamination sites at United States bases. However, the IR
program does not apply to overseas bases; therefore, the
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environmental condition of the facilities as they now stand
will pretty much be the environmental condition at formal
turnover. The only exceptions to this policy will be to take
those actions necessary to ensure the facilities are in a
environmentally safe condition at turnover (e.g., removal of
waste materials which are already contained in drums to ensure
no environmental degradation caused by the withdrawal)
.
The real environmental issue is one of public
relations, and how we explain to the general public our
position in such a way as to leave behind a good impression of
the United States Navy. The key element to all of this is
that we are meeting all of the minimum requirements and are,
in fact, doing more environmentally than GOP is asking us to
do.
As a sidelight, DOD is developing a environmental
guidance document known as "The Worldwide Baseline Standards,
"
which will be used by all DOD activities in conducting their
operations. The overall goal is to have all United States
military activities comply with national requirements, and
where local requirements are more stringent, to comply with
those requirements as well. This new guidance will also apply
to United States overseas facilities.
B. LITERATURE RESEARCH
Numerous documents, including point papers, DOD/Navy
message traffic and DOD/Navy directives, were reviewed by the
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researcher to enlarge the scope of the data base from which
the case in Chapter IV is written. Factual elements in the
case were taken from the interviews. However, the documents
described provide good background and supplement the
researchers knowledge gained through the interview process.
The documents [in Appendices C through H]
,
are grouped by
functional area using the following labels: DATE/TYPE OF
CORRESPONDENCE - SUBJECT/TITLE - AUTHOR/ORIGINATOR.
• Appendix C, includes a copy of a point paper which
provides a statistical and literary overview of the
accomplishments completed in the withdrawal process.
• Appendix D, identifies documents reviewed supporting
facilities turnover.
• Appendix E, identifies documents reviewed supporting
security planning.
• Appendix F, identifies documents reviewed supporting
personnel planning.
• Appendix G, identifies documents reviewed supporting
property disposal procedures.





In December 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the
Foreign Bases Treaty Agreement and forced the United States
government to implement withdrawal and closure plans for the
United States Naval Base at Subic Bay, Republic of the
Philippines. This case illustrates the evolution of
management controls by the Commander-in-Chief United States
Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) to implement planning strategies
for the United States naval base closure.
The case focuses on events occurring from the middle of
calendar year 1991 through the beginning of calendar year
1992. This time period provides a unique opportunity to study
the shift from the strategic planning phase to the plan
implementation phase. Several factors, including functional
organizational structures and timing of events, contribute to
the case and provide clarity in the study of the processes in
use. The case captures an overlying vision statement by
Admiral Kelly (CINCPACFLT) , and tries to carry this vision via
case content through to the evolution of multiple management
control systems.
TEACHING THE CASE
CINCPACFLT, a large U.S. Navy headquarters staff employing
Total Quality Management/Total Quality Leadership principles,
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conducted the strategic planning and devised the subsequent
management controls which were used by subordinates to
implement the personnel withdrawal, equipment disposition,
ammunition withdrawal and the facility/base closure plans.
Specifically, readers could be asked to identify structures
and impediments to management control systems that were
founded in the strategic planning phase and used in plan
implementation. Insights gained from identifying the origins
of management control systems may help students gain a better
perspective of how strategic planning contributes to overall
plan effectiveness.
The instructor may ask students to identify Admiral
Kelly's vision statement and extrapolate the vision through
developed strategies to the subsequent management controls.
Developing a timeline might be a useful technique to help
students focus on the critical issues in developing the
withdrawal plan.
Another method to develop student thinking about the
withdrawal process in the classroom, would be for the
instructor to organize the data students develop from
answering the questions at the end of the case, in a visual
format for discussion and analysis in a seminar. Labels to






PURPOSE < WHY > < WHY >
GOALS < HOW > < HOW >
(Steps or increments)
OBJECTIVE < WHAT > < WHAT >
(To achieve the strategic objective)
j LINKAGE j
Examples of information which could be classified under
the labels include, but are not limited to:
Vision - Admiral Kelly's statement that "the most
important thing the Pacific Fleet will accomplish in
1992," regarding the base closure process is a good
example of the underlying vision propelling the Pacific
Fleet base closure process.
Strategy - Planning/Purpose - - Develop a systematic method
of action to deal with the uncertainty surrounding the
base negotiation process. This was done through multiple
efforts to cover contingencies regardless of the base
negotiation process. Elements of this process included
diverse and varied input to the planning process through
many different mechanisms including meetings, briefings,
and a staff sub- organization (PWG)
.
- Planning/Goal - - Follow events of the time
closely and shift staff planning (only) to accommodate
changes resulting from changes in the two governments'
positions. Indicators included the stalled negotiation
process and contradictory signals provided by the
different branches of the Philippine Government.
Planning/Objective -- Develop a flexible
response plan to maximize Pacific Fleet preparedness for
potential withdrawal, regardless of base negotiation
decision. The CINCPACFLT plan to develop this response
would be independent of action taken by the Philippine
government. This plan would meet the needs of the Navy
and be consistent with strategic doctrine as defined by
the joint commander in the Pacific (USCINCPAC)
.
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- Implementation/Purpose - - Segment the overall
scope of the withdrawal plan into manageable elements by
which controls could be used to measure performance.
These elements were the individual plans actually
implemented. The SITREP messages were one of the primary
management mechanisms used by CINCPACFLT by which
oversight and control was exercised.
Implementation/Goal -- Use an incremental
approach during implementation of individual plans.
Update implementation strategy and plans as events
unfolded.
- Implementation/Objective -- Complete individual
plan elements to satisfy performance and timing objectives
of overall withdrawal plan.
Controls - Planning controls included: Admiral Kelly, PWG
lead members, PWG, PWCG, round table meetings, the
strawman plan elements and associated feedback mechanisms
(decision matrix, briefings, memos and point papers), and
the provisions in the individual plans.
- - Purpose - - measure progress and completeness
of developing plans (usually at the round table meetings
or when a major decision point was reached)
.
Goal - - use control systems to match
efficiencies (or lack of) of CINCPACFLT staff organization
during a once- in-a- lifetime evolution.
-- Objective -- develop and use controls to
enhance potential success of plan during actual
implementation.
- Implementation controls included: The planning
controls above and the briefs/SITREPS discussed at the end
of the case.
- - Purpose - - measure progress and completeness
of the implementation process (SITREPS and briefings)
.
Goal -- use control systems to match
efficiencies between staffs and between individual plan
elements
.
Objective -- use controls to measure
performance during implementation and to provide
historical record of events as they unfolded.
Once the qualitative data are tabulated, students could
discuss the significance of linkages between the phases. An
example of linkage between concepts could be the
transformation of the withdrawal and closure plan from the
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planning phase to the implementation phase via the use of the
PWG as a feedback mechanism. Used to accommodate new
information which resulted in changes to the plan and
strategy, the PWG was built into the management structure to
ensure many of the staff officers responsible for the detailed
strategic planning were also included in the implementation
process. The PWG, as an oversight committee, operated beyond
established staff procedure and protocol, and was used by
senior staff officers to develop, coordinate, and administer
elements of the closure and withdrawal plan. This could be a
major point of discussion for the students, the need for and
use of a new or independent organizational element to manage
predictable but non- systematically recurring events. This
structural feedback loop contributed to the dynamics of the
ongoing processes by making resident corporate memory an
available asset throughout the entire process.
WHY USE THIS CASE
This case might be used as a military example in providing
a complimentary case for instructors using primarily corporate
or public sector cases. The case could provide study and
discussion material for comparing and contrasting non-
financial related strategic planning and management control
processes used in a military organization, to those controls
which might be used by a large corporate staff undergoing a
major subsidiary or divisional restructuring.
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The following questions are the same questions as those
that follow the case. Questions and sample answers are
provided here to assist the facilitator in developing case
concepts when teaching the case. If you would like a
reproducible copy of the teaching case contact Professor K. J.
Euske at the Naval Postgraduate School. His address is listed
in the distribution list at the end of the thesis.
CASE QUESTIONS
1) How did the nature of the basing negotiations between the
two governments affect the staff planning process?
The stop and start nature of the negotiation process
combined with the political sensitivity surrounding the
negotiations contributed to a somewhat sporadic effort in
planning which was clouded by uncertainty. Many in- country
experts closest to the withdrawal issues could not be brought
into the planning process for practical purposes until
execution commenced in late January 1992. The exclusion of
this source of information was considered essential to limit
the potential compromise of information which might be
critical to the late stages of the negotiations. While the
true scope of the impact on the withdrawal plans of not using
the in- country experts may never be known, the case writer
feels the withdrawal plans were probably less robust than they
might have been, had all in- country resources been made
available to staff planners. One impact which was readily
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apparent was that equipment and property inventory lists were
being developed well after withdrawal commenced. Decision
makers in- country must have been hampered by this because
decisions on disposal mechanisms could not go forward until
the lists were complete.
The base negotiation process dragged on through much of
the 1980' s. Planning activity for a United States withdrawal
tended to fluctuate with the level of uncertainty surrounding
the negotiations at the time. Because of the long planning
process and sporadic level of effort, many experts who had
envisioned the initial elements of a potential withdrawal had
moved on to other jobs or taken different positions within
their respective staffs. These people, for the most part,
were no longer available for guidance or providing background
information. Time itself had made some provisions of the
early plans obsolete. Evolving world events, such as the end
of the cold war, contributed to previous strategic assumptions
which were no longer valid in the withdrawal equations of the
early 1990's.
2) What aspects of the organizational structure of CINCPACFLT
staff support the transition from the strategic planning phase
to plan implementation?
CINCPACFLT staff, as with many military staffs, is
structured in such a way that strategic planning and the
resulting plan implementation can take place within the staff
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organization at the same geographical location. The
Philippine withdrawal planning evolution and subsequent plan
implementation was no exception. Before the PWG was
established, Philippine planning and issues were handled in a
routine environment by the staff element responsible for
issues in their respective areas. Overlaying the PWG on the
normal staff organization provided focal points within the
staff which resulted in the creation of staff experts in the
Philippine arena. These experts were given legitimate power
to cut across a functional staff organization to carry out
their respective charter including recommendations on issues
as well as assignment of tasking to the staff. In the
casewriter's opinion, this type of modification to the staff
organization created flexibility; it allowed the decision
makers to bring a focusing agent in as an asset to accomplish
a very important evolution outside the typical
responsibilities carried out routinely by the Pacific Fleet
staff. The PWG sub- organization was created from within staff
assets to give leverage to the Philippine effort; it provided
a mechanism by which to focus critical planning skills without
subverting the staff from administering their duties in the
day-to-day running of the "greater Pacific Fleet."
3) What factors in the case hindered or helped the transition
from planning to implementation? Why was CDR Matthews able to
take over the administration of the withdrawal plan with so
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little background in Philippine issues and so little time to
review staff plans?
Related to question one, this question focuses on LTCOL
Huddleston's efforts in developing the "Strawman Plan."
Exhaustive effort went into developing the "Strawman Plan."
Inputs included previously written plans, staff expert advice,
currently available data, and feedback from the roundtable
meetings and PWG. Additional input was obtained from
type/fleet commanders (exhibit 2) after the "first cut"
"Strawman Plan" was sent to these subordinates for their
comments. This feedback, organized into a matrix decision
analysis tool, was very effective in addressing issues and
concerns in the fleet because the format removed emotion from
the process, yet allowed unfiltered concerns and issues to be
heard at the decision making level.
The capture of detail and the complexity of the "Strawman
Plan" helped the transition to implementation. External
influence through the matrix was reflected in provisions of
the plan which, in the casewriter's opinion, added legitimacy
to the plan elements, making the plan supportable. While RADM
Mercer's staff in the Philippines did not fully participate in
the initial planning process, there was input from the NAVPHIL
staff once implementation began. Although timing problems
arose, they were eventually overcome mostly through closer
coordination between the two staffs. Bringing NAVPHIL staff
into the withdrawal planning process sooner may have avoided
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the need to solve the coordination problems during
implementation.
Notwithstanding CDR Matthew's personal ability, there were
many elements of the planning process which contributed to a
smooth transition from planning to implementation. These
elements included a well-defined staff charter with continued
high visibility from above, access to the staff, access to
plans, good communications inside and outside the staff, a
good understanding of the staff organization, and leverage to
keep Philippine issues in the foreground of staff efforts.
There were many other issues outside the Philippine evolution
competing for staff involvement, including the Navy's new
forward strategy after the end of the cold war and the day- to-
day running of the fleet, which might have detracted from the
Philippine effort had CDR Matthews allowed this to happen.
4) Is there a connection between strategy and management
controls presented in the case? Is there linkage among the
vision, strategy and controls?
Linkage between strategy and management controls was
previously discussed in the teaching note. An example of
linkage between vision and controls could be the development
of the briefs and SITREP message discussed at the end of the
case. Both of these control systems provide valuable
information and feedback to Admiral Kelly (and staffs)
.
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The strategy was designed in support of the vision and
contained many elements including information exchange, a
defined course of action, establishing modes of feedback,
providing for external input to resulting plans, and
maintaining flexibility by using an incremental approach in
evolving CINCPACFLT planning.
5) Address CDR Matthew's concerns in formulating the strategy
to develop the SITREP and briefing which are discussed at the
end of the case.
Not all control systems can be controlled or manipulated
by a few individuals. In this case, CDR Matthews was given a
great deal of responsibility and latitude in developing two
control systems closely linked to feeding back information to
decision makers. His concerns were mostly tied to efficient
presentation of information. He was concerned about neither
inadvertently screening out important information nor creating
information clutter in designing both of these control
systems. Although not discussed explicitly in the case, there
would be a degree of risk (could ask students what CDR
Matthews perceived risk was in developing these control
systems as a way to explore question 5) in allowing staff
briefers to present the overview of the Philippine briefings.
While professional at presenting information, these briefers
were by no means expert on Philippine issues. They may
inadvertently present information inaccurately or at the very
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least, less robustly than members of the PWG would. The CINC
and other staff admirals probably received the greatest dose
of Philippine information for future decision making at these
briefs. It was important to ensure the information presented
was of the highest quality.
All CINCPACFLT Situation Report messages on the Philippine
withdrawal were released for transmission by Rear Admiral
Robinson. For CDR Matthews, building the first SITREP would
probably be the most difficult because the message had to
address the issues, yet convey a positive or negative "tone"
on the progress of the withdrawal. The issue of tone was
important because moving in one direction or the other could
affect the organizationally acceptable form of the message for
seniors, at the expense of the message information content to
subordinates. Could both of these concerns be satisfied
simultaneously? The challenge would be to incorporate
subordinate and CINCPACFLT staff SITREP information in such a
way as to satisfy organizational expectations, while
maximizing the value of this control system to the users of
the SITREP information.
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IV. MANAGEMENT CASE STUDY
The United States military found itself asking what kind
of force structure would it need to meet the threats of the
future. New thinking would be required in the areas of
technology, weapons, personnel and facilities to support the
military in its continuing global role during an era of
declining defense budgets following the winning of the cold
war and economic collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Philippine people after nearly 200 years of colonial
rule (Spain and the United States) followed by the
dictatorship of the "Marcos regime, " seemed poised to fully
implement the principals of democracy within the elements of
a free market system. The U.S. military bases at Angela City
and Subic Bay were the last vestiges of "neo- colonialism"
remaining from an era which was very slow in dying.
These forces, different yet intertwined, would combine to
change drastically the relationships experienced in the last





Commander Danny Matthews was sitting at his desk, on 10
February 1992, at Commander-in-Chief United States Pacific
Fleet (CINCPACFLT; pronounced sink-pack- fleet ) headquarters in
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii reviewing the morning message traffic.
After sifting through an inch of messages he culled a
Situation Report (SITREP) message for critical reading and
possible action, which described the progress of the United
States Navy's withdrawal effort from the Philippines. Until
then, the implementation process had proceeded relatively
smoothly with few surprises. Commander Matthews considered
this remarkable, given the scope of the project, since
implementation of the withdrawal plans had moved from the
planning stage to execution during the previous week.
Contingency planning at CINCPACFLT for a military
withdrawal coincided with the treaty negotiations between the
two governments for basing rights in the Philippines. These
negotiations had been ongoing through much of the 1980' s. The
specific planning for executing a withdrawal had actually
begun during the past summer when the possibility of at least
a partial United States withdrawal moved much closer to
reality. Commander Matthews found it hard to believe that so
much had happened in the past six months.
One of the SITREP messages described a sharp increase in
the backlog of visa and marriage applications awaiting
processing. Since the United States' intent to withdraw had
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been formally announced, many in- country service members made
the decision to marry locally. All of these marriages would
require completion of unanticipated quantities of paperwork
before the new families could be transferred out of the
Philippines. This issue, potentially could slow down the
timetable in the Personnel Withdrawal Plan if new dependant
processing did not keep pace with the plans to transfer
individual members. CDR Matthews decided to contact the Fleet
Manpower Division to obtain the latest information on the
issue prior to the staff "morning message lineup, " where
important issues and concerns would be addressed with the
department head, Rear Admiral (RADM) Holian. CDR Matthews had
to determine whether the issue would warrant eventual
inclusion in the CINCPACFLT SITREP message to be transmitted
at the end of the week. Not only did such day-to-day issues
require resolution, but frequent re- evaluation was required of
the entire evolution within the context of Admiral Kelly's
expectations and perceptions. In this case, either the
Personnel Withdrawal Plan timetable might be modified or an
administrative solution to accommodate the increased paperwork
from the influx of new servicemember dependents might be
required.
Admiral (ADM) Robert J. Kelly as Commander-in-Chief United
States Pacific Fleet, was responsible for administering United
States Navy interests in an area of responsibility above and
below sea level which extended over more than one million
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square miles of surface water, including most of the Pacific
and Indian Oceans and adjacent coastlines. Closing the base
at Subic Bay in the Republic of the Philippines would be a
major evolution for Admiral Kelly and the Pacific Fleet.
The implications for closing the base at Subic Bay were
serious because of the loss of a major strategic Pacific Fleet
logistics facility and comprehensive training area for Navy
and Marine forces. Many of the facilities at Subic Bay
(including the live fire ranges) were unique and their loss
would be missed. Some of the unusual functions performed at
the Subic Bay facilities would be shifted to other bases in
the Pacific. Organizations whose operations were similar to
those being performed elsewhere in the Pacific would be
disbanded to accomplish the Pacific Fleet drawdown objectives
following the end of the cold war.
In addition to the SITREP CDR Matthews was also thinking
about the development of a briefing package to present bi-
weekly withdrawal progress to the senior staff admiral, ADM
Kelly, and other members of the CINCPACFLT staff. He was
confident a briefing would be an acceptable way to determine
Admiral Kelly's feelings and concerns about the progress of
the withdrawal, but was not sure whether the brief should
follow formal staff briefing procedures or if the uniqueness
of this evolution warranted special handling.
CDR Matthews knew whatever else happened, it was important
to address emerging issues head on and keep the withdrawal
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schedule on track to meet the one year limit. The briefings
would help convey the "big picture" on the drawdown progress
to the staff and the SITREPS would help focus Pacific Fleet
assets to resolve emerging problems. Someone (in- country or
on this staff) would have to make sure any proposed changes to
approved plans could be assimilated within the overall plan to
ensure plan integrity and timeline continuity. Subic Bay was
a big base. There was potential for many things to go wrong




The Naval Base at Subic Bay was a huge, sprawling
facility, encompassing more than 23,000 acres of land and
water, which served aircraft and ships of the United States
Seventh Fleet. Some of the facilities at the base included a
operational airfield, a ship repair facility, a fuel farm to
support ship and base fueling needs, a hospital, a naval
supply center, several deep draft piers to support the United
States Navy's largest ships and submarines and all of the
infrastructure necessary to support 23,000 permanent workers
and residents. Base support was also occasionally extended to
as many as 11,000 transient sailors and marines from visiting
United States Navy ships.
PLANNING UNDER A CLOUD OF UNCERTAINTY
As previously stated, the negotiations between the
Philippine and United States governments for long-term United
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States military basing rights at Subic Bay in the Philippines
had been ongoing through much of the 1980' s. By the middle of
1991 the negotiation and treaty ratification process had
become suspect because factions of the Philippine government,
namely the Philippine Senate, were giving indications that the
treaty might not be ratified as proposed. The possibility of
at least a partial United States withdrawal became more likely
with each passing day.
In the late summer of 1991, ADM Kelly chaired a roundtable
meeting at staff headquarters in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The
roundtable format was used when the CINC wanted access to a
representative cross section of the fleet staff which numbered
approximately 300 officers, 220 enlisted personnel and 160
civilians. The officers chosen to represent their
organizations in the staff generally had expertise in the
roundtable discussion topics and could present the "staff"
position on the issue being discussed. Participants in the
roundtable discussion group included the CINC's personal
staff, the deputy CINC, deputy and assistant chiefs of staff
(division heads) , and the twenty- three standing members of the
Philippine Working Group (PWG) . The meeting was held to
discuss the implications of continued U.S. Navy presence at
Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines. Whatever the outcome
of the negotiations, ADM Kelly was determined that the Pacific
Fleet would be ready and able to effect any emerging strategy
regarding the Navy's interests in the Pacific.
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During the meeting, Admiral Kelly expressed his beliefs
that should the base negotiations fail and end in treaty-
rejection, the subsequent base withdrawal and closure process
"would be the single most important thing accomplished by the
Pacific Fleet in 1992." He was adamant that the Pacific Fleet
staff make whatever preparations were necessary to explore
options and write a plan for withdrawal which, if required,
could be implemented on extremely short notice.
THE STRATEGY
COMING UP TO SPEED
Lieutenant Colonel (LTCOL) Huddleston reported to
CINCPACFLT staff on 18 July 1991 as the Assistant for Marine
Corp matters in the Plans and Policy division (6 Div) (see
Exhibit 1) . He was also assigned to lead member the
Philippine Working Group (PWG) . LTCOL Huddleston, from his
first day on staff, suspected Philippine issues had the
potential to demand a large portion of his work day. He set
out to immediately review written plans, files and other
background sources to become knowledgeable of the Philippine
situation. Initially, he concentrated on the base negotiation
process and previously written and approved contingency plans,
which were essentially "what if?" plans, should the
negotiation process fail. He reviewed two sets of plans in
depth. One was the Facilities Closure Plan (FCP) which was
constructed in the mid- 1980 's and looked broadly at eight core
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areas to be considered in a foreign base withdrawal and
closure. The other plan was known as the 19 89 Bases
Relocation Plan, which was a plan to conduct withdrawal under
conditions of political or military turmoil. He also
interviewed staff officers to discuss current planning




In late August 1991, analysis of the political
undercurrents in the Philippines indicated that the
negotiations may not yield a treaty acceptable to all the
political powers involved. Given the prospect of at least a
partial withdrawal, ADM Kelly ordered a "Strawman Plan" to
outline what the course of action might be. The Strawman was
to be very broad in nature with loosely defined goals, but
incorporate "some" level of detail which could be used to
facilitate current and future withdrawal planning. LTCOL
Huddleston went to work using both the Facility Closure Plan
and the Bases Relocation Plan as a foundation for Strawman.
LTCOL Huddleston also thought about using his in- country
contacts on RADM Mercer's (COMUSNAVPHIL) staff, who operated
the United States facilities at Subic Bay, to generate ideas
and evaluate proposals for Strawman. The military and
civilians on RADM Mercer's staff were closest to the issues
and should have had the best feel for what might and might not
work. The in- country staff would also be the primary agents
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to conduct a withdrawal if the basing negotiations
deteriorated. LTCOL Huddleston had to be careful how he
proceeded, however, the CINCPACFLT staff had been given
direction to minimize contact with in- country personnel
because of the "politically secret" nature of the base
negotiation process. This security step was considered
necessary to assure an effective negotiation. The drawbacks
to using minimal input from the in- country staff, who were
five thousand miles away from the staff in Pearl Harbor, could
be troublesome should these plans be implemented.
The almost daily changing political scene in the
Philippines and the "closed door" nature of the negotiations
greatly influenced the building of Strawman. The Facility
Closure Plan (FCP) , CINCPACFLT staff, and new data from sites
outside the Philippines were the most useful sources for
evolving a plan.
The Vote
The Philippine Senate rejected the negotiated bases treaty
agreement on 17 September 1991. One plausible explanation for
the treaty rejection was an attempt by elements of the
Philippine government to extract a higher price from the
United States for the basing concessions, thereby using the
treaty and its potential ratification as a bargaining tool.
In any case, the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) , executed in
1988, provided that the bases would be maintained in the
Philippines at least until 31 December 1991. Additionally,
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the United States would have one year from 31 December 1991 to
close the bases if terms for a new basing agreement could not
be reached by that time. Concurrent with the Philippine
Senate's rejection of the negotiated treaty the Philippine
Constitution had also been re-written, which included a
provision for immediate disestablishment of all foreign
military bases on Philippine soil.
While the executive branch of the Philippine government
acknowledged opposition to the treaty, outright treaty
rejection by the Philippine Senate was largely unanticipated.
The significance of the Philippine Senate vote created great
confusion in determining the true scope of the wishes of the
Philippine government. On the one hand, the Philippine
President and many of the Philippine people supported the
bases. Conversely, the Philippine congress was against the
bases as indicated by the vote. However, there would be
several more months of political wrangling before the true
fate of the bases would be determined.
Adapting
LTCOL Huddleston knew the September vote would be a
critical event and had planned Strawman accordingly. When the
Philippine Senate rejected the treaty, CINCPACFLT staff,
through LTCOL Huddleston' s coordination efforts, already knew
much of what they were up against if a full withdrawal was
warranted. Strawman contained a rough time table with
concepts and major functions outlined, and was considered a
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good blueprint by staff planners for any future planning
effort
.
In late September 1991, the CINC called another roundtable
meeting to discuss options and ramifications in dealing with
the variables surrounding the rejection of the basing treaty.
Various mission contingency and withdrawal options were
discussed. The main thrust of the meeting was to determine
the effects of the treaty rejection, and develop options to
address those impacts.
Strawman was one of the options presented, and was chosen
for continued staffing as it was the most likely overall
course of action given the events of the time. By the end of
September, ADM Kelly had approved the major elements of
Strawman with some qualifications. Additional planning was
required to ensure adequate base security during drawdown,
member and dependent quality of life was maintained at the
highest level possible during the drawdown and that future re-
establishment of commands in the Philippines affected by the
withdrawal be re -evaluated within the context of the overall
Pacific Fleet force structure. 1 The PWG was called upon to
1 Following the end of the cold war, many elements of the
U.S. military were downsizing consistent with the reduced
force structure required to support the new base force
concept. For the Pacific Fleet, the timing of the Subic Bay
withdrawal coincided with the review process to achieve the
new force levels consistent with overall military strategic
planning doctrine. Many of the tenant commands being dis-
established in the Philippines would be not be re-established
at other Western Pacific locations in order to meet the
Pacific Fleet objectives under the base force concept.
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investigate and resolve the issues associated with the
Admiral's concerns.
The PWG was one of several management mechanisms which was
relied on from time to time to conduct timely research and
make recommendations and decisions. When an emergent issue
required attention, a PWG issues meeting was called. The
CINCPACFLT staff divisions each had at least one of their
officers on the PWG. The strength of the PWG was in its
membership with, area expert middle-grade, staff officers
bringing diversity and competency to the issues, available at
one place at one time to hear the issues, solve problems, and
make recommendations and decisions. After the withdrawal
plans were implemented most new or evolving issues were
generally handled in a routine staff environment. A
Philippine Withdrawal Coordination Group (PWCG) comprised of
seven members from the PWG, and chaired by the leader of the
PWG, acted as a steering group for channeling various issues
to the appropriate staff division codes for action. The
Assistant Chiefs of Staff (ACOS's) in these divisions worked
individual issues by delegating them to the appropriate action
officer experts. The PWCG was also used to provide senior
officer decision support when issues and questions required
immediate responses.
When Admiral Kelly's reservations were resolved, the
Strawman was approved for transmission to subordinate
organizations in the Pacific Fleet for their comments on the
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plan's feasibility and completeness (Exhibit 2). Subordinate
organization comments were consolidated and presented to
Admiral Kelly in a matrix format: the rows were labeled with
the individual issues and the columns with the individual
organizations solicited. Entries in the matrix were
"concur/not concur." The staff, through the PWG, also
provided input recommendations to the issues in the matrix.
Strawman, along with the matrix comments, was presented to
Admiral Kelly at another roundtable meeting, where each issue
was addressed item by item. Eighty percent of the plan was
approved at this point, with more information needed to clear
up the remaining points.
From this point, additional development of Strawman was
iterative as new information was obtained and incorporated
into the plan. Major points required Admiral Kelly's approval
(sometimes in a roundtable format) . Minor points were
addressed in point papers which were circulated to various
staff divisions for comment, concurrence and recommendations
before reaching the appropriate senior officer for a decision.
By the first week in December Strawman was considered complete
by Admiral Kelly, but was not yet approved by authority above
CINCPACFLT for execution.
FORMAL NOTIFICATION TO WITHDRAW
The United States military played a role in the Philippine
military, economic, and political scene from when "Admiral
Dewey sunk an antiquated Spanish armada at Manila Bay in May
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1898," except for a brief occupation by Japanese forces in
World War II.
The Philippine people were divided on whether the United
States should have a continued military presence in their
country. However, many of the country's influential elite
felt trapped in the United States' shadow and believed the
only way the Philippines could achieve true national
independence was by severing any remaining colonial bonds
binding the two countries. President Aquino attempted to
revive the treaty debate within her government following the
Philippine elections in the fall of 1991. However, these
efforts failed to reverse the inertia of events following the
Philippine Senate vote. By mid-December the effort by the
Philippine executive branch to keep the bases in the
Philippines was viewed as an overall failure. While the
provisions in the revised Philippine constitution for early
closure of the bases had failed, the United States' remaining
hope for keeping the Philippine bases had been quashed. On 31
December 1991, the one year time clock, as dictated by the
Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) , began ticking for the United
States to remove its military presence from the Philippines.
Initial projections indicated the Pacific Fleet would meet the
one year time constraints contained in the MDT and would
complete the processes before the 1992 Christmas Holidays.
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IMPLEMENTATION
The Pacific Fleet Philippine Withdrawal Plan was prepared
for implementation in January 1992. The plan was transmitted
as a directive to organizations above and below the CINCPACFLT
chain of command. To subordinates and stovepipe organizations
the directive initiated withdrawal operations 2 . For
superiors the directive included provisions that, unless
otherwise directed, execution of the withdrawal plan would
begin immediately. In late January and early February,
detailed briefings of the plan's provisions were given to
United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific (USCINCPAC) , Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) and the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
(Exhibit 2)
.
United States Commander-in-Chief Pacific is a joint
command made up of elements of the Air Force, Army, Navy and
Marines and is responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
to carry out strategic and tactical doctrine consistent with
United States' political and military goals in the Pacific,
Indian and Southeast Asian theaters. CNO/SECNAV ensure all
United States Naval forces meet readiness requirements to
support JCS doctrine and own most of the infrastructure to
support Naval forces worldwide. They all approved the
Philippine withdrawal plan as briefed.
2 A stovepipe is a command organization with physical
interests in the Philippines, but is not fiscally or
operationally responsible to CINCPACFLT.
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SHIFT IN LEADERSHIP
With the plan in the initial stage of implementation, a
need arose to shift day to day management of the plan to a
division more concerned with current operations.
Responsibility for executing the withdrawal plan within the
CINCPACFLT staff shifted, on 3 February 1991, from the Plans
and Policy Division under Rear Admiral Paulsen, to Resources
and Logistics under Rear Admiral Holian (Exhibit 1) . As RADM
Holians agent, the Fleet Comptroller, Captain Osterhoudt,
assumed responsibility for executing the withdrawal plan.
Other divisions on the staff had competent officers who could
have assumed these duties (e.g., Logistics, Supply,
Personnel)
.
Captain Osterhoudt recommended to RADM Holian that
Commander Matthews take the lead in conducting the staff
withdrawal effort. CDR Matthew's involvement in the
Philippine withdrawal process began as a result of the
decision to shift responsibility for withdrawal implementation
to the Fleet Comptroller. Well -regarded by other staff
members and senior officers, Commander Matthews was originally
assigned as a special projects officer and problem
troubleshooter for the Fleet Comptroller. Commander Matthews
knew that spearheading the withdrawal effort would be a
welcome challenge and would provide a relatively long-term
focus to his duties. Along with the shift in responsibility
for implementing the plan came a change in the lead membership
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of the Philippine Working Group. LTCOL Huddles ton would be
replaced as chair of the PWG by Commander (CDR) Matthews.
THE STRATEGY FOR IMPLEMENTATION
During the last week in January 1991, LTCOL Huddleston's
Division Head, CAPT Prather gave a brief to the CINCPACFLT
staff outlining the details of the withdrawal and closure
plan. The brief had two purposes: 1) Provide up-to-date
information on Philippine issues to CINCPACFLT staff, and 2)
Provide a dress rehearsal brief for the presentation that
would be given to USCINCPAC/CNO/SECDEF (Exhibit 2) for their
evaluation and approval of the plan's elements. CDR Danny
Matthews formally assumed PWG chair and withdrawal plan
implementation duties after attending the dry- run brief and
spending one day in early February to review the Philippine
files
.
The strategy for implementing the United States Navy base
closure was conceptually built around individual functional
plans (e.g., facility closure, security,
civilian/military/Filipino personnel, equipment/ammunition/
property removal and disposal, and environmental closure).
These individual plans began as elements of Strawman and had
been refined over the months leading up to implementation.
Rear Admiral Mercer's staff in the Philippines did not see
these plans in detail until a few days prior to receipt of the
implementing directive in January 1992, because of the
security concerns surrounding the negotiations.
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The Facility Closure Plan
Facilities turnover and the security plan were highly
integrated within the overall withdrawal plan. CINCPACFLT
staff provided oversight and coordination for the CINC, while
Rear Admiral Mercer's staff was responsible for physical
accomplishment of the withdrawal effort. As selected portions
of real estate were turned over to the Government of the
Philippines (GOP) , the remaining facilities would serve as
support structures to conduct the next phase of the turnover.
Once facility turnover commenced, entire areas of real estate
would be relinquished and the security perimeter collapsed
(Exhibits 3-6) . The jungle adjacent to the Naval Facility was
the first area turned over to the Government of the
Philippines (GOP). Several housing areas, a communications
center and the Naval Station were among the next areas turned
over. This included most of the Naval Station infrastructure,
the ship repair facility, the Public Works Center and many
ship piers. Preceding the next perimeter collapse the
hospital was turned over. Final facilities turnover would
occur at the Cubi Point Naval Air Station to include the Naval
Magazines, the Naval Supply Depot warehouse compound, fuel
farm, airfield, infrastructure and remaining ship piers. The
key element in relinquishing the facilities was coordinating
the provisions of the security and other withdrawal plans with
the Facilities Closure Plan.
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Security Plan
The extent to which there might be local political and
civil unrest as a result of the closures was unclear. If
there were negative reactions resulting in violence, the
phasing of the overall withdrawal plan might be interrupted
and the base and its citizen populations threatened.
Therefore, implementation of the security plan was considered
essential before other elements of withdrawal could be
implemented.
The security plan was integrated throughout all five
phases of the withdrawal. The first phase included moving all
off -base United States personnel onbase before suspected
controversial elements of the withdrawal plan (e.g., the
Reduction in Force Program for those Filipinos working on the
base) were implemented. This action was considered very
controversial because many of these Americans would be
required to leave their homes off -base and move on-base almost
a year before the final United States personnel would be
required to leave the Philippines. Security concerns in the
remaining phases dealt with the security of the facilities on
the base and contingency planning (much of it classified) if
previously undisclosed threats occurred. CDR Matthews stated,
"The security plan in conjunction with the withdrawal plan
supported a phased fall -back approach, turning over base real
estate to the Philippine government in stages." A new United
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States perimeter was established at each of the fall -back
positions (Exhibit 3-6).
The Commanding Officer of the Marine Barracks at Subic Bay
became the central command and control point for security.
The most likely primary threats to Subic security were
expected to be "economic intruders" (i.e., groups or
individuals infiltrating and stealing base property) and
groups opposed to American presence in the Philippines. These
threats resulted in the establishment of a multi- layered
security net which included gate guards, perimeter patrols and
counter- insurgency forces, designed to protect personnel,
facilities, and other government assets. Bringing all United
States citizens living outside the base, onto the base, timing
of the Filipino Reduction- in- Force program, centralizing
command and control, phasing the fall -back, and re -enforcing
a multi -layered security net were the key elements in the
security plan.
The Personnel Withdrawal Plan
The Personnel Withdrawal Plan was logistically one of the
more challenging aspects of the Philippine withdrawal process
planning. Approximately 11,000 United States military,
civilian and dependent personnel were scheduled to be
relocated throughout the process. Timing of the individual
personnel moves had to be coordinated with most of the other
plans being implemented. Consideration had to be given to:
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• Sequencing the removal of security personnel to support
the required manning for the phased fall -back plans.
• Incremental removal of personnel from the Philippines
within the constraints of the available air mobility
command resources
.
• The complexity of coordinating the activities of ninety-
three separate commands being disestablished and twenty-
seven of those commands relocated in other areas. Each
command determined its respective minimum manning levels
for each phase of the withdrawal.
• Removal of dependents, their vehicles and their associated




• Supply support redistribution
• Aviation maintenance support
• Pets were a special logistics problem because a quarantine
period of four months was required for the forty pets
going to Guam. Insufficient quarantine space was
available on Guam to accommodate these pets. The solution
was to transport these pets to Hawaii for quarantine and
then ship them to Guam before the pets could be released
to their owners. Pet sponsors had to be recruited in
Hawaii to ensure pets were adequately cared for while
their owners completed their tours and transfer
requirements in the Philippines.
Most importantly, the plan had to be flexible enough to
ensure the unique needs of the individuals were satisfied.
On-site personnel, detailing teams and 800 phone numbers were
just a few of the mechanisms implemented to provide access to
information, and to help ease the transition of so many
members transferring from one location over a relatively short
period of time. The key elements for the personnel plan were
73
flexibility in the face of uncertainty, needs of the Navy, and
compassion for the service members and families.
Releasing the Filipino Nationals
Of the 23,000 personnel affected by the drawdown, 12,000
were Philippine Nationals who would be left behind without the
livelihood they had depended upon for many years. These
people were mission essential to base operations and were
highly integrated throughout many of the facilities and
military commands (e.g., Ship Repair Facility and fuel farms)
.
The Reduction in Force Program was the vehicle used to release
the Filipinos. The plan was integrated with basing and labor
union agreements which included provisions for severance pay,
early retirement packages, and bonuses as financial tools to
ease their transition from United States government
employment. All of the workers were to be released by 30
September 1992. Mission essential personnel would be hired
back on 1 October as temporary employees to ensure minimum
manning would be maintained to support the late stages of the
withdrawal
.
The key guidelines were to meet the minimum manpower
levels required to support withdrawal and to the maximum
extent possible minimize the economic impact on loyal
employees. The Reduction in Force Program was integrated into
the security plan. The incremental release of workers and
commencement of the Reduction in Force Program only after all
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Americans were moved on base were specific aspects of this
program designed to enhance security planning.
The Property, Ammunition and Equipment Shipment and
Disposal Plans
These plans required the longest lead time of all the
plans effected in the withdrawal process because of their
complexity in scope. Obtaining detailed inventory lists was
extremely manpower intensive and time consuming. Lists were
still being generated after implementation commenced. These
plans were re-written many times to reflect current inventory
levels. Incomplete inventories did result from the changing
political events and security conditions during the many
months leading up to the commencement of withdrawal.
Property
The non- removable base property (including real
property) would revert to the Philippine government, as
provided for by a previous memorandum of agreement, when the
United States forces withdrew3 . Removable property
disposition, of which equipment was a subset, would be
determined by the United States. Classification of property
was sometimes controversial (i.e., non-removable versus
removable) between the two governments and contributed to the
delay in generating accurate property and equipment lists.
3 Non- removable property as defined in the 1988
Memorandum of Agreement between the United States and the
Philippines included buildings, structures physically attached
to the ground and structures which would be damaged if moved.
75
Prolonged delays could have impacted the logistics planning
necessary to support removal of the property or other
disposition status.
Ammunition
The ammunition stocks in the Philippines were
scheduled to be removed by Navy ammunition ships. These
stocks would be sent to other Western Pacific locations to
keep ammunition levels in- theater consistent with strategic
planning doctrine. This was an extraordinary undertaking
because the ammunition magazines held a large percentage of
the strategic stockpile present in the Western Pacific.
Equipment
The disposition of equipment at Subic Bay was
determined in several ways. First, detailed equipment lists
were developed by on-site personnel and evaluated at the Naval
Supply Center at Subic Bay, to determine the economic
feasibility of shipping equipment to other United States
locations for Department of Defense (DOD) use. If the
equipment was uneconomical to ship or was not needed
elsewhere, it was placed on the Excess Equipment List for
disposal in the Philippines.
Excess Equipment Lists were presented to the GOP for
"First Right to Acquire." 4 The GOP could purchase all or as
4 The provision for "First Right to Acquire" of the
equipment on the inventory lists was a provision under the
Schultz/Manglopos 19 88 Memorandum of Agreement, which provided
the GOP a "first look" at these lists if the United States
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little as none of the equipment on these lists. If GOP
declined to purchase the items on these lists, the equipment
was turned over to the Defense Re-utilization and Marketing
Office (DRMO) for disposal.
DRMO could dispose of equipment in one of four ways:
Any DOD activity which wanted the equipment could obtain
it through established re-utilization procedures.
Equipment could be transferred to the Philippine Armed
Forces (AFP) through provisions of Article 519 of the
Foreign Assistance Act (non- lethal aid to modernize the
AFP). U.S. congressional approval would be required to
transfer material under Art. 519.
Equipment could be granted to various charitable
organizations both inside and outside the Philippines.
Remaining equipment could be auctioned to the highest
bidder.
The key elements for these plans were completing
unfinished equipment lists to determine disposition of the
equipment, scheduling shipping to support removal of
equipment, other material, ammunition, supply stocks and
establishing disposal procedures for all assets not shipped.
The Environmental Plan
CINCPACFLT's legal division, through consultation with
DOD legal experts, determined that United States environmental
laws did not apply at Subic Bay because of the practice of
International Comity (i.e., comply with the host country




laws) . However, DOD requirements and actual practice by the
Navy in Subic Bay exceeded requirements of host country laws.
Therefore, the resulting environmental plan ensured adequate
environmental protection by not allowing degradation to occur
during the withdrawal process, maintaining safety standards at
the facilities during turnover, and protecting human health.
Hazardous waste at the facilities was to be packaged and
shipped to United States for disposal in accordance with U.S.
law. Over one million pounds of PCB's and 300 thousand pounds
of other hazardous wastes stored throughout the facilities
required packing, shipping, disposal and special handling.
The key element was developing the environment plan through
international provisions and United States law.
AT THE HELM
CDR Matthews had been at his new job directing the
Philippine effort for about one week. Activity levels were
increasing as implementation commenced. He thought the
process was going smoothly, considering the massive scope of
the project and the hectic planning process that occurred in
the fall. He believed two upcoming events would require a
great deal of his attention. First, he had to draft a
CINCPACFLT version of a Situation Report Message (SITREP)
,
which, when released for transmission, would be sent to the
key commands implementing the withdrawal plan for action and
information, and sent to senior commands throughout the Navy
to provide information on withdrawal progress and emerging
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issues. Second, he had to prepare the first flag level bi-
weekly brief on the progress of the withdrawal.
THE SITREP
The SITREP was a specifically formatted Navy status report
message used by commanders to report extraordinary events
and/or give updates on complex operations. Incoming SITREPS
from subordinates were already landing on CDR Matthews' desk.
Many of the SITREPS identified items which required resolution
at the CINCPACFLT level, and were good sources of information
to compile the CINCPACFLT SITREP that would eventually be
transmitted to higher authorities. CDR Matthews determined
the subordinate SITREPS required wide dissemination among the
staff for general information purposes and for giving a "heads
up" for future tasking. CDR Matthews, in coordination with
the PWCG, routed copies of the SITREPS as appropriate.
CDR Matthews wondered how he would track issues and
CINCPACFLT action items raised on subordinate SITREPS (from
the Philippines and other Pacific commands) and how action
responsibilities should be assigned among the CINCPACFLT staff
(via routine staff channels or continue with the PWG/PWCG
charter) to handle the issues and action items. Keeping track
of all the information himself could prove to be more than a
full time job. One way to give the action items the
appropriate level of visibility would be to create a "tickler
file" which could be updated by the officer responsible for
specific action items. The data in the file could contain the
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specific item description, the due date for action and
identify the officer specifically responsible for its
completion. This file when updated could then be reviewed, if
necessary, on a daily basis by Admiral Kelly. CDR Matthews
believed involving himself in unresolved issues would be a
good way to keep abreast of emerging developments and
considered a routine telephone contact system might be a good
way to contact staff and in- country experts to get the latest
information available.
CDR Matthews was also concerned with the tone and the
amount of information he would include in the initial draft of
the CINCPACFLT SITREP. Did Admiral Kelly want to address all
of the issues raised by the feeder inputs, or did he want to
address outstanding issues which were left unresolved by the
time the SITREP was constructed?
Classifications of the various types of information which
might be included in the CINCPACFLT SITREP included: status
reporting on cargo awaiting shipment; passenger movements by
air and surface transportation; numbers of pets moved; status
of excess material; DRMO disposal progress; numbers of
military and DOD civilian personnel left in- country awaiting
transportation; status of current level of withdrawal effort
(in percentage terms) projected forward; financial statistics
such as costs incurred to date, projected costs remaining and
funding shortfalls; and legal issues such as lawsuits pending,
visa/marriage applications outstanding and Foreign Military
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Sales (FMS) of in- country material to date. A narrative
section on major accomplishments to date and major problems
left to overcome could also be appropriate. CDR Matthews was
not sure of the exact nature of the CINCPACFLT SITREP, but
knew he needed to draft a SITREP message and forward it up the
chain of command to get a reading from the admirals on the
structure of the message using information similar to that
described previously.
BI-WEEKLY BRIEFINGS
Periodic staff briefings on various issues were a long
standing CINCPACFLT method of conveying information to the
CINC and other staff officers. Usually, once-a-week briefs
were conducted in the fleet command center by staff briefers
on the current status of world events in general and the
Pacific Fleet specifically. Because of the special nature of
the Philippine withdrawal process and because of the
relatively long-term nature of the evolution (one year), CDR
Matthews thought a more focused approach in doing the
Philippine brief would be more appropriate. One way to
achieve this level of focus would be to call on individual
staff experts, rather than the professional staff briefers, to
deliver their respective portion of the brief. This would
make the best information available, close and personal, to
the CINC. One drawback would be the increased coordination
which would be required on a continuing basis to ensure a
smooth flow of information and briefers.
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CDR Matthews thought the fleet command center had
inadequate seating to accommodate the number of potential
officers conducting and attending the Philippine withdrawal
briefs. However, only select components of the staff would be
involved in the briefing process at any one time and he
estimated the interested audience excluding staff admirals
would be much smaller than the weekly briefings given in the
command center. Other potential briefing sites included
Intelligence division's "secure" conference room (more seating
capacity but smaller visual displays) or the CINC's personal
conference room (small seating area, limited capability for
visual displays, but convenient for the admirals)
.
He wondered about who would coordinate and give the brief
and considered placing the burden of the preparation on the
PWG. He also saw the need to focus on the format and
information content. CDR Matthews knew practice briefings
would be a good mechanism to get the technicalities right, but
wondered who would be best at tying all the various elements
of the presentation together for the actual brief. Should one
of staff briefers do it, or was he the best choice for the
job?
There was so much to do and so little time.
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Exhibit 1
A partial organizational diagram for the staff of the




ADM Robert J. Kelly
Deputy Commander-in-Chief
U.S. Pacific Fleet
RADM David B. Robinson
Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans
RADM Thomas D. Paulsen
Chief of Staff for
Logistics
RADM F. Holian
Assistant Chief of Staff for
Plans and Policy
6-Division




Fleet Marine Corp Assistant/
PWG Chairman for Planning Phase
Code 612
LtCol Craig S. Huddleston
Operational Systems Development/
PWG Chairman for Implementation
Phase, Code 91
CDR Danny G. Matthews
83
Exhibit 2
A partial organizational diagram of the command
structure for the U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commander
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Gen Colin Powell
Secretary of the Navy
Honorable Sean O'Keefe
U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
ADM Charles R. Larson
Chief of Naval Operations
ADM Frank B. Kelso
U.S. Commander-in-Chief
Representatative, Philippines
RADM Thomas A. Mercer
Commander-in-Chief
U.S. Pacific Fleet
ADM Robert J. Kelly
Commander
Naval Air Force Pacific
VADM Edwin R. Kohn
Commander
Naval Submarine Force Pacific
RADM Henry C. McKinney
Commander Third Fleet
VADM Jerry L. Unruh
Commander
Naval Surface Force Pacific
VADM David M. Bennett
Commander Seventh Fleet
VADM Timothy W. Wright
Commander
U.S. Naval Forces Phillippines
U.S. Facilities Subic

















1. ACOS - Assistant Chief of Staff
2. ADM - Admiral




5. CINC - Commander-in-Chief
6. CINCPACFLT - Commander in Chief United States Pacific
Fleet
7. CNO - Chief of Naval Operations
8. DOD - Department of Defense
9. DRMO - Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office
10. FCP - Facilities Closure Plan
11. FMS - Foreign Military Sales
12. GOP - Government of the Philippines
13. JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
14. LTCOL - Lieutenant Colonel
15. MBA - Military Bases Agreement
16. PWCG - Philippine Withdrawal Coordination Group
17. PWG - Philippine Working Group
18
.
RADM - Rear Admiral
19 SECNAV - Secretary of the Navy
20. SITREP - Situation Report
21. USCINCPAC - United States Commander in Chief, Pacific
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CASE QUESTIONS
1) How did the nature of the basing negotiations between the
two governments affect the staff planning process?
2) What aspects of the organizational structure of CINCPACFLT
staff, supported the transition from the strategic planning
phase to plan implementation?
3) What factors in the case hindered or helped the transition
from planning to implementation? Why was CDR Matthews able to
take over the administration of the withdrawal plan with so
little background in Philippine issues and so little time to
review staff plans?
4) Is there a connection between strategy and management
controls presented in the case? Is there linkage among the
vision, strategy and controls?
5) Address CDR Matthews' concerns in formulating the strategy
to develop the SITREP and briefing which are discussed at the









3 . CAPT Robert Cyboron
4 . CDR Mary Dimel
5 . CDR Marvin Dodge
6 . CAPT Don Edgerton
POSITION
International Law Attorney for
CINCPACFLT staff, PWG member
Head for Facilities Planning and
Real Estate Department for
CINCPACFLT Staff
Current Operations Officer for
CINCPACFLT Staff
Pay/Personnel Administration
Support Program Manager for
CINCPACFLT Staff
Military Sealift Command Liaison
Officer to the Pacific Fleet,
Commanding Officer Military
Sealift Command Tagos Unit
Pacific, PWG Member
Commander Defense Logistics Agency
Pacific and Defense Reutilization
and Marketing Region Pacific,
PWG Member
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7. YNCM Gary Eisenbraun Military/Civilian personnel
advisor for CINCPACFLT staff
8. CDR Ed Eng Deputy Head Public Works Support
Department/Special Assistant for
the Ecology for CINCPACFLT Staff,
PWG Member
9. CAPT E. Fessler Negotiation Representative to
USCINCPACREP PHIL, Jul 86 -Jan 90;
Commanding Officer Naval
Investigative Service Area
Command Pacific, PWG Member
10. DKCS Ricardo Francisco Military Pay Advisor for
CINCPACFLT Staff
11. RADM F. Holian Deputy Chief of Staff for
Resources and Logistics for
CINCPACFLT
12. LTCOL C. Huddleston Plans and Policy Assistant for
Marine Corp matters/Southeast
Asia Plans Officer for
CINCPACFLT Staff, Lead Member
PWG During Planning
13. LTCOL J. Huddack Fleet Logistics Program/FMF
liaison for CINCPACFLT Staff
14
.
CAPT Gary Ikuma Fleet Aviation Engineering and
Maintenance Officer for
CINCPACFLT Staff, PWG Member
92
15. CDR Forrest Kirk
16. Ms. Maureen Kleintop
17. CDR Anthony Luzinski
18. LT Steve Manning
19 . CDR Danny Matthews
20. Mr. Dan Morris
21. Mr. Bill Posnecker
22. CDR John Quinn
23. LT Ken Ross
Services and Base Development
Officer, Lessons Learned




CINCPACFLT Staff, PWG Member
Security Assistance/FMS Plans for
CINCPACFLT Staff
Fleet Law Enforcement/Physical
Security for CINCPACFLT Staff,
PWG Member
Operational Systems Development
Branch for CINCPACFLT Comptroller,
Lead Member PWG for Execution
Mapping/Chart ing/GEODESY Officer
for CINCPACFLT Staff, PWG Member
Western Pacific Activities
Officer for CINCPACFLT Staff
Fleet Environmental Officer for
CINCPACFLT Staff
Assistant Public Affairs Officer
for Operations for CINCPACFLT
Staff, PWG Member
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24. Mr. Jim Shaw
25. CDR Charlsie Slagel
Chief of Planning and Operations








The thrust of the interviews will be concentrated on
determining facts by illustrating relationships between
strategic planning (processes to uncover new ideas or
threats) , and management controls (controls on individual
tasks, optimum decision making, cause and effect)
.
The researcher believes this research effort and the
resulting written case is a terrific example to illustrate the
relationships defined above, because the withdrawal and
closure of the Naval Complex at Subic Bay can be considered a
one time event for which no predetermined pattern or system
exists. Listed below are the questions which the researcher
believes were pertinent to the fact finding phase of the
research effort.
1) What was the scope of your involvement in the withdrawal
process?
2) From your perspective what are/were the major issues for
withdrawal and closure in your area of responsibility?
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3) What were the planning factors considered in determining
the time line for the withdrawal and closure in your area of
responsibility?
4) What were the lateral relationships (within the staff)
that were established to help accomplish the objectives in
your area of responsibility? How did these relationships help
in the planning and control process? How did these
relationships develop? How were they managed?
5) Did subordinates (outside the staff) participate in the
planning/control processes? If so, what was the scope of
their participation?
6) If you had to redo the entire process, what parts of the
planning and controls would you do differently? Why?




OVERVIEW OF WITHDRAWAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The following facts were taken from a 1 October 1992 point
paper written for CINCPACFLT staff by CDR D. Matthews.
BACKGROUND
In December 1991, the Philippine Senate mandated the
United States military depart the Republic of the Philippines
by 31 December 1992. Withdrawal was completed 24 November
1992.
DISCUSSION
The withdrawal plan in conjunction with the security plan
supports the phased fallback approach turning over real estate
to the GOP in stages.
The Naval Station, Kalayaan and Binictican Housing, Grande
Island, and Mount Santa Rita were the first parcels of real
estate turned over on 30 September 1992.
The Naval Magazine and Naval Hospital were the next
facilities turned over.
The Marine Expeditionary Force camp, Naval Supply Depot
Warehouse Compound, Fuel Pier, and Fuel Farm were the next
facilities turned over.
Naval Air Station, Cubi Point was the final facility
turned over on 24 November 1992.
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Recovered more than eight million dollars from the sale of
U.S. government assets to third parties.
All remaining United States forces withdrew to amphibious
ships on 24 November 1992.
Logistics requirements to support the withdrawal effort:
• Costs to withdraw: 208 million dollars in moveout costs,
265.3 Million dollars for military construction projects
in Guam, 473.3 million dollars total cost.
• Decommission and disestablishment approximately ninety-
three commands, relocate approximately twenty- seven
commands
.
• Relocate approximately 10,000 United States military,
civilian and dependent personnel.
• Terminate employment for 13,000 Philippine Nationals using
the Reduction in Force Program.
• The packing and shipment of approximately 450,000
measurement tons of cargo by roll -on/roll- of f , break bulk
and container shipping.
• The packing and shipping of approximately 1.5 million
pounds of hazardous wastes and 800 thousand pounds of
PCB ' s
.
• The redistribution of 184 thousand mandays of ship
maintenance work throughout the Pacific Rim.
• The redistribution of Cubi Point aviation maintenance
work.
• The redistribution of 540 million dollars worth of supply
support stock and workload.
• The redistribution of 92 thousand tons of ammunition
stocks and associated maintenance.
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DOD Policy and Proced- SECDEF
ures for the Return to
Host Governments of
Overseas sites.
















DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING SECURITY PLANNING
Documents reviewed during study of security planning.
DATE/CORRESPONDENCE SUBJECT/TITLE AUTHOR/ORIGINATOR
15May92 Point Paper Philippine Withdrawal LCDR Radebaugh
Security Plan. CINCPACFLT Staff
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APPENDIX F
DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING PERSONNEL ISSUES
Documents reviewed during study of Personnel Issues
.
DATE/CORRESPONDENCE SUBJECT/TITLE AUTHOR/ORIGINATOR
16Apr92 Point Paper Philippine Withdrawal YNCM Eisenbraun
Personnel Interest CINCPACFLT Staff
Items
.
1991/92 Policy Guidelines for,
Change of Permanent Various








DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING PROPERTY DISPOSAL










DOCUMENTS SUPPORTING ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES















15Nov91 Point Paper Navy Installations CDR R. Quinn




Documentation of CDR R. Quinn
Contamination in the CINCPACFLT
Philippines
.
29May92 Point Paper Philippine Environ- CDR R. Quinn
mental Issues . CINCPACFLT
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